Monday, April 13, 2009

Final Report

Youth Club 96
In 1996 the implementing partner of UMCOR in the Gornji Vakuf (GV) Youth House project was the United Nations Office in Vienna Volunteer Project (UNOV). This group of volunteers was based on a model the group coordinator developed in Pakrac, Croatia. These volunteers worked directly in the community. Project goals were very broad and included putting grassroots peace building on the agenda of the United Nations. The idealism of the volunteer can be compared with the distortion to the long-term policies of the international NGOs and their failure to designs exit strategies. UMCOR had a municipal rehabilitation project in GV sponsored by USAid, which insisted on spending money only on joint use buildings. The project was in crisis as the project manager Julia Demichaelis described, “We are forbidden to install proper heating systems and effect other repairs because, at the moment, neither community feels emotionally prepared to share public housing. And quite frankly, I don't blame them.” UMCOR decided to bring their new idea of a sustainable youth house projects to GV. UNOV had been interested in working with UMCOR as they also were looking for ways to expand their funding base. The project was created on the dividing line between Moslems and Croatians. The boarder of the Republic of Bosnia ran right through the middle of town. This project like the one in Zenica was designed for youth between 5 and 18. In all the youth house projects there was a larger number of younger children participating. GV is a very small city with a pre-war population of 20,000. There is a definite delineation of the urban field as it is so small. Within the older urban youth population there was a growing resentment to the youth house. A very visible project, the youth house, was bringing computers into town for the first time, but only for those under 19. It must be understood that GV had a relatively low percentage of displaced persons other than those displaced within the community itself. GV was also per capita the hardest hit location in Bosnia. This conflict within a conflict developed into a civil war within a city exacerbated by outside influences. One young man 19 years old, who was displaced from his family’s apartment on the current dividing line, made a direct challenge to the UNOV coordinator on behalf of his generation. UNOV had programs for children through the youth house, projects for the elderly including visits and woodcutting, and projects for woman including the newly formed income generating sewing project, but there was no specific programs for the 18-30 age group. The UNOV coordinator negotiated directly with the community and as to this question he had no response. Immediately an excess in the budget was found to support an exploratory project. The design of the UNOV project was to encourage initiatives from the community. In the case of the UMCOR youth house project there was no specific initiative it simply seemed reasonable. It allowed the UMCOR rehabilitation project to begin to start spending money on direct support of the community and a joint use facility. Youth Club 96 was different and began with a gathering of old friends who had lived together on the current dividing line. On each side of this line different currencies were used, such was the extent of the division. The club developed into a music, media and video project. The Club thrived in 1997 after a grant of 15,000 DEM from the Hailey Foundation based in Great Britain. Cooperation was developed in Mostar through the Office for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The club made a documentary of their youth festival including dozens of youth organizations from the similarly divided Mostar. A mixed musical group of Moslem and Croatians was formed and later performed throughout the youth house system. Funding was later received from the IRC Umbrella grant (supported by OTI Office for Transitional Initiative a special branch of USAid) to cover the cost of the space being used. This 20’ x 30’ space cost $800 a month due to its prime location on the dividing line. Prices for these properties inflated immediately after the arrival of international NGOs and their concentration along that line. Key assurances of continued funding was given by OTI in the fall of 1997. However, the coordinator of the project who had originally formed the project and was the unifying force in the club relocated to Belgium. He relocated to avoid serving in a nonintegrated military. A second fact conspired to seal the fate of Youth Club 96 when the US government interpreted the Bosnian elections. Funding priorities where shifted from the Republic of Bosnia to Herzegovina (the southern Croatian dominated area of Bosnia) and the Serbian controlled parts of Bosnia. These areas were considered more radical and in greater need of local NGO creation, which was certainly a valid position. The problem was the break-neck speed at which the money followed with the decision. GV was located approximately 15 mile from the delineating line of the US government and OTI. Despite the clubs strong connection with Mostar, the largest city in Herzegovina, funding for the club was terminated. The members of the club who expected to have a longer transition period to a new funding source, found themselves ill prepared without their founding member. The Club is currently a rug store. The Youth Club represents the idea that a local NGO can be created and funded like an international NGO. Basically a NGO in general receives money to do humanitarian missions. There are no income activities as described above. The only sustainable future for any international NGO is a steady flow of money from donors of all types, including foundations, governments, the United Nations and other sources. This was the same reality for the Youth Club. Unfortunately IRC had to work by OTI rules in order to administrate the well-financed umbrella grant. The dialogical momentum of the income generation theory of local NGO sustainability had greatly influenced OTI’s decision-making process. The youth club had no real results in this area aside from generating income for participating member in various innovative ways. The mixed musical groups formed in the club did go on to work in the community. The club simply failed to gain critical mass in its funding and failed as most NGOs created do. This example is the exception to the rule in Bosnia. The majority of the local NGOs created followed a model similar to the Youth House Zenica.
The three initiative created in the former Yugoslavia followed the following models:
 Direct creation and support by international NGO’s
 A local initiative creating a NGO with cooperation of an international organization.
 A local initiative independently creating a local NGO without initial international support.
These three models represent the majority of NGO creating activity since the destruction of Tito’s Yugoslavia in the 1990’s. The practices outlined above created a third sector that is competitive where it should be cooperative; uncertainty and confusion have created a dialogical division between the international NGO and the local NGO. The myth that there is a fundamental difference between a multi-million dollar NGO and a new local initiative meeting for the first time was created by the international work force in the former Yugoslavia. The third sector is but a mirror of the international community that is prone to shatter, as have the recent hopes for Kosovo. Examples of the first two models were described above. We will now leave the international community for a while and focus on an example of the third type of NGO creating activity.

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