Mode 33

Therefore, the sages way of governing begins by
       Emptying the heart of desires,
       Filling the belly with food,
       Weakening the ambitions,
       Toughening the bones
                                              TTChing 3

My mode has become 33 these last three years
The median and and the mean also, just three numbers
A number of blogs that I thought might last perhaps longer than these papers

Your World

It is your world outside and in ours and who we are
See everything that is before you rain falls when you watch it go down

"I cannot tell how my ankles bend...nor whence the cause of my greatest wish." Walt Whitman

"Men argue, nature acts!" Voltaire

"There is nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so." Shakespeare

Trillion Dollar Questions

We don't do things exactly as we have always done them.  People leave people grow and take over new functions.  Society mixes through.  This last finacial crisis the Federal Reserve created trillions of dollars to loan anybody they could taking anything offered for collateral.

Many different numbers but 13 billion is an amount made taking no interest loans and loaning it to the US government for low interest.  How could they do that? They couldn't it was this new generation here.  Things continue to hold together and houses continue to empty.

We are heading into 2012 and going nowhere.  When things got really bad they just created money from nothing and everyone went along.  We stopped making so many things if ships from China failed to arrive we would have serious problems.  They manipulate their currency to keep our prices cheap.  We move our production there and borrow our money to spend it again.

We owe them two trillion dollars?  What are they worth when the federal reserve can make seven trillion when they really want too.  They don't want to for any good reason and the funny reason is no one will go along.  We called what we did to survive this financial crisis.  Why cant we create seven trillion dollars again for a good reason and solve the worlds problems?  Call them moon bonds.

There is no reason we can't.  They did it for stupid reasons and everyone goes along.  So for what are we willing to bend the rules of reality?  When our banks fail?  It is our imagination that is corrupted.  We can imagine seven trillion reasons to fear and none to hope.

This may last, but a trillion years? could you google this then?

INTERGRATION OF WAR AFFECTED PEOPLE IN AN URBAN SETTING

The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina left an urban core populous with unique experience dealing with international non-governmental organizations (NGO’s).  The third sector in the former and current Yugoslavia lacks sustainable practice and management.  International organizations were more anxious to fund local initiatives than to find good information about the situation on the ground. New unsustainable yet well-financed initiatives were created, which removed human resources from competing and more sustainable initiatives, and created a social welfare loss in the third sector.  Three organizations working in urban settings will be discussed:

v      Youth House Zenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina working with youth aged 5-18.

v      Youth Club 96, Gornji Vakuf, Bosnia and Herzegovina working with former soldiers 18-30. 

v      Center for Nonviolent Conflict Resolution Nis, Yugoslavia dealing with a mixed group of member’s aged 16-35.

The organizations and urban settings described below cannot easily be compared to the average western urban experience.  In societies that have not experience warfare rates of 10 percent for depression and 8 percent for PTSD (Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder) would be considered troublesome[i].  The point being not only that the society under stress has more depressed people, but also that these depressed individuals have a larger peer group.   The affects of war are just beginning to be understood in a scientific manner and research is still at an early stage.  In Bosnia and Herzegovina there are currently numerous research projects under way trying to document the extent of “transition problems.”  Most in the field agree about one thing: a return to the status quo cannot be achieved in the short term.  How long?  How costly?  In what ways?  What are the consequences?  These are the questions that still need to be answered. Currently the United Nations has determined that they need to scale back their original goals of creating a multi-ethnic state in Kosovo in the short-term.  The stated priority of the responsible body for the international protectorate is to simply stop them from killing each other.  Currently less than half of the requested 6,000 UN police force has arrived.  KFOR (the acronym for the peace keeping force) has been formulated from the experience of UNPROFOR, IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia and the Dayton Peace Agreement, the supposed great success story of American foreign policy in 1995.  As Hoffmann states “It is difficult to interpret Dayton as being more than a construction aimed at giving the Clinton administration a “victory” that would last until the 1996 election-whatever happens afterwards-…”[ii]

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[i] isib?

[ii] Hoffman page 59

NGO Context

      Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can spend as much as 10 billion dollars in a single year.[i]  In certain situation they have more money available than the United Nations.  In many instances certain governments feel more dollars will reach the intended purposes by dealing with the international NGO rather than the local federal government.  In the case of Serbia proper (Serbia minus Kosovo) this has certainly been the case in the past.  In order to work this way certain sacrifices have to be made.  There has been an international presence in Belgrade, which while small to start with has been deteriorating steadily.   Project selection for the most part has occurred from a distance.  Random visit has been the only feasible contact.  The NGO workers in Serbia are mostly local workers with little or no exposure to international organizations.  There was a rather alarming episode of a local NGO in Belgrade only producing material in the English language.  The situation in the Bosnian and Croatian Federation was markedly different.  There was a large international presence and projects for the most part where initiated and managed by international staff.  In the Serbian controlled parts of Bosnia there was a similar experience as that in Serbia proper, however this area will not be a focus of this research as it is so similar and represents an almost completely rural area.  The only exception is Banja Luka in the northern part of Bosnia.  The NGO community there has always had close ties with Belgrade and for our purposes will be considered an extension.  Where information is given about the history of these NGO communities in Serbia and Bosnia it must be understood that there was no corollary to the current third sector before the break up of Tito’s Yugoslavia.  In communist system the only non-governmental organization where the mountaineering groups and other similar loose associations and the idea of citizen action with out the direct support of the government was completely foreign.  The entire history of the NGO community in the former Yugoslavia spans less than ten years.  The international NGO arrived in an emergency situation and needed to train a new labor force.  They found very capable workers and due to the time and money constraints their introduction to the basic idea of the NGO as experienced in the west was limited.  International NGO workers were given sweeping tasks to complete and relative freedom in their general approach.  In an emergency response coordination of vehicle use is a higher priority than coordination of ideas.  This is not a condemnation of international NGOs, but a simple reality.  Safety of international workers is of primary concern of the NGO as is appropriate in the current environment.  An emergency project is by nature a constantly evolving process.  A good example of this is was the implementation, by the United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR), of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) emergency shelter project.  UMCOR began repairing several collective centers.  These for the most part were located in schools and other government structures providing supposedly temporary shelter for displaced persons.  Field workers identified the lack of service for the youth living within these centers.  While services to the this population were limited, for the workers on the ground the presence of idle and stressed youth was certainly more disturbing.  Services available in the urban field were generally not available to the displaced person, as they were seen by most of the native residence as the largest problem within the city.  Discrimination was in most cases strong enough to discourage the displaced population’s hope of integration in the short-term.  The UMCOR workers identified spaces within the collective centers that could be economically recreated as childcare centers.  Material excess from the general repair budget was used to create these areas.  These spaces where naturally tied to the newly open Youth House Zenica, which we will discuss later.               This example shows the common sense remedies inspired by the local work force in Bosnia.    In July of 1995 the UN safe haven Zepa fell to the Bosnian Serbs.  Five to ten thousand displaced persons were expected to arrive in Zenica, which was already overflowing.  UMCOR was asked to construct sanitation facilities for the tent city being created on the very edge of the urban field.  In this case it was the local government that came up with an innovative solutions to their own political problems.  By placing the new arrivals on the fringe of the urban field residence within the urban core would not be as affected by the large influx.  From these temporary tent cities the new arrivals would be later integrated in to the existing collective centers.  Lessons where learned from a similar arrival of displaced persons from Serbrenica a week early.  These arrivals were placed again in yet more government buildings within the urban core, which was a direct immediate hardship upon the community.   A lack of space within the urban core lead directly to the creation of the tent city concept seen throughout central Bosnia in 1995, which some later evaluated as the superior model.  There was a paradigm shift in the dialogical context of the international NGO worker, but it was the real-time problem solving skills of the local workers that made the tent city concept possible.  The workers came from private industry, academia and even the transitional government.    This was their first experience in the third sector and they accomplished the majority of the actual work being done.

        In Bosnia many thing were new; UNHCR for the first time was keeping an urban population from starving in Sarajevo, which was never their design.  The unsteadiness of international communities response to the crises in the former Yugoslavia is in stark contrast to the innovative work being created by the local work force through 1995.  With the Dayton agreement a new era is ushered in, that of the multinational contractors entering Bosnia, we will revisit this era later.  Hoffman describes the international communities response as a flip-flop practice of assigning blame.  At times the various Serbian militaries where seen as aggressors.  While at other times the situation was treated as a civil war.  At certain times each military manifestation was treated on equal terms, but the reality of the situation was that the majority of International NGOs were located and worked exclusively within the Republic of Bosnia, which contained the majority Moslem population and was seen by most casual observers as the victim of the war, civil or otherwise.  There was a paper and vocal neutrality, but there was a real and massive bias for one side.  Naturally the most experienced NGO workers in the region are from within the Republic of Bosnia.  These individuals accommodated this irrational position held by the international work force in the daily workings of the International NGO, officially neutral and quietly biased.  In most cases since this bias severed their own community this contradiction was seldom challenged by the local work force. 

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[i] UNHCR PUB NGO’s and UNHCR

Youth Club 96

In 1996 the implementing partner of UMCOR in the Gornji Vakuf (GV) Youth House project was the United Nations Office in Vienna Volunteer Project (UNOV).  This group of volunteers was based on a model the group coordinator developed in Pakrac, Croatia.  These volunteers worked directly in the community.  Project goals were very broad and included putting grassroots peace building on the agenda of the United Nations.  The idealism of the volunteer can be compared with the distortion to the long-term policies of the international NGOs and their failure to designs exit strategies.  UMCOR had a municipal rehabilitation project in GV sponsored by USAid, which insisted on spending money only on joint use buildings.  The project was in crisis as the project manager Julia Demichaelis described, “We are forbidden to install proper heating systems and effect other repairs because, at the moment, neither community feels emotionally prepared to share public housing. And quite frankly, I don't blame them.”  UMCOR decided to bring their new idea of  a sustainable youth house projects to GV.  UNOV had been interested in working with UMCOR as they also were looking for ways to expand their funding base.  The project was created on the dividing line between Moslems and Croatians.  The boarder of the Republic of Bosnia ran right through the middle of town.  This project like the one in Zenica was designed for youth between 5 and 18.  In all the youth house projects there was a larger number of younger children participating.  GV is a very small city with a pre-war population of 20,000.  There is a definite delineation of the urban field as it is so small.  Within the older urban youth population there was a growing resentment to the youth house.  A very visible project, the youth house, was bringing computers into town for the first time, but only for those under 19.  It must be understood that GV had a relatively low percentage of displaced persons other than those displaced within the community itself.  GV was also per capita the hardest hit location in Bosnia.  This conflict within a conflict developed into a civil war within a city exacerbated by outside influences.  One young man 19 years old, who was displaced from his family’s apartment on the current dividing line, made a direct challenge to the UNOV coordinator on behalf of his generation.  UNOV had programs for children through the youth house, projects for the elderly including visits and woodcutting, and projects for woman including the newly formed income generating sewing project, but there was no specific programs for the 18-30 age group.  The UNOV coordinator negotiated directly with the community and as to this question he had no response.  Immediately an excess in the budget was found to support an exploratory project.  The design of the UNOV project was to encourage initiatives from the community.  In the case of the UMCOR youth house project there was no specific initiative it simply seemed reasonable.  It allowed the UMCOR rehabilitation project to begin to start spending money on direct support of the community and a joint use facility.  Youth Club 96 was different and began with a gathering of old friends who had lived together on the current dividing line.  On each side of this line different currencies were used, such was the extent of the division.  The club developed into a music, media and video project.  The Club thrived in 1997 after a grant of 15,000 DEM from the Hailey Foundation based in Great Britain.  Cooperation was developed in Mostar through the Office for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).  The club made a documentary of their youth festival including dozens of youth organizations from the similarly divided Mostar.  A mixed musical group of Moslem and Croatians was formed and later performed throughout the youth house system.  Funding was later received from the IRC Umbrella grant (supported by OTI Office for Transitional Initiative a special branch of USAid) to cover the cost of the space being used.  This 20’ x 30’ space cost $800 a month due to its prime location on the dividing line.  Prices for these properties inflated immediately after the arrival of international NGOs and their concentration along that line.  Key assurances of continued funding was given by OTI in the fall of 1997.  However, the coordinator of the project who had originally formed the project and was the unifying force in the club relocated to Belgium.  He relocated to avoid serving in a nonintegrated military.  A second fact conspired to seal the fate of Youth Club 96 when the US government interpreted the Bosnian elections.  Funding priorities where shifted from the Republic of Bosnia to Herzegovina (the southern Croatian dominated area of Bosnia) and the Serbian controlled parts of Bosnia.  These areas were considered more radical and in greater need of local NGO creation, which was certainly a valid position.  The problem was the break-neck speed at which the money followed with the decision.  GV was located approximately 15 mile from the delineating line of the US government and OTI.  Despite the clubs strong connection with Mostar, the largest city in Herzegovina, funding for the club was terminated.  The members of the club who expected to have a longer transition period to a new funding source, found themselves ill prepared without their founding member.  The Club is currently a rug store.  The Youth Club represents the idea that a local NGO can be created and funded like an international NGO.  Basically a NGO in general receives money to do humanitarian missions.  There are no income activities as described above.  The only sustainable future for any international NGO is a steady flow of money from donors of all types, including foundations, governments, the United Nations and other sources.  This was the same reality for the Youth Club.  Unfortunately IRC had to work by OTI rules in order to administrate the well-financed umbrella grant.  The dialogical momentum of the income generation theory of local NGO sustainability had greatly influenced OTI’s decision-making process.  The youth club had no real results in this area aside from generating income for participating member in various innovative ways.  The mixed musical groups formed in the club did go on to work in the community.  The club simply failed to gain critical mass in its funding and failed as most NGOs created do.  This example is the exception to the rule in Bosnia.  The majority of the local NGOs created followed a model similar to the Youth House Zenica. 

        The three initiative created in the former Yugoslavia followed the following models:

v   Direct creation and support by international NGO’s

v   A local initiative creating a NGO with cooperation of an international organization.

v   A local initiative independently creating a local NGO without initial international support.

        These three models represent the majority of NGO creating activity since the destruction of Tito’s Yugoslavia in the 1990’s.  The practices outlined above created a third sector that is competitive where it should be cooperative; uncertainty and confusion have created a dialogical division between the international NGO and the local NGO.  The myth that there is a fundamental difference between a multi-million dollar NGO and a new local initiative meeting for the first time has been created by the international work force in the former Yugoslavia.  The third sector is but a mirror of the international community that is prone to shatter, as have the recent hopes for Kosovo.  Examples of the first two models were described above.  We will now leave the international community for a while and focus on an example of the third type of NGO creating activity.

Creation of the International NGO

 Funding for the international NGO comes from a variety of source from penny drives to multi-million dollar grants mainly from the G7 nations.  NGO have broad mandates and very subjective criteria for reporting progress.  The greatest amount of innovation to be found in the international NGO is in the area of evaluation.  The terminology changes with each new funding cycle because increasingly donors are looking for more objective evaluation models.  There is an unnatural strength in the organizations for developing evaluation models for funding proposals.  The reality for the international NGO is that funding for emergency projects are generally earned by reputation and proposal candy.  In the development phase there is a high requirement for professionalism.  The difficulty arises from the lack of objective queues of the transition period.  International contractors such as the International Management Group, based in Cleveland, came in direct competition with voluntary international NGOs.  A good litmus test for the start of the development phase is the arrival of these international contractors.  NGO which have developed large projects and large payrolls (both local and international) find exit strategies lacking.  The NGO needs to define a policy for withdrawal before they enter a country in order to obtain initial funding, but these policies tend to mirror the policies develop for peace keeping mission.  The original mandates for every international peace keepers that have operated in the former Yugoslavia has been extended.  During the transition phase in Bosnia, from the emergency phase to the developmental phase, NGOs need a new funding strategy to justify their continued presence.  In the environment in Bosnia it was much more reasonable to seek funding for one more year than to begin to think about dismantling a large organization that the international and local work force had created together.  In 1994 the strategy needed was created within the Bosnian international work force: International NGOs were needed to create local NGOs because there was no other organizations qualified.  This theory had a dialogical birth in the informal networking of the international NGO workers.  The evolution was fueled by a common fear of the international contractors.  IMG began implementing large projects in 1995 that where foreshadowed by there initial presence in 1994.

Youth House Zenica

The original UMCOR project was funded by UNHCR to address the integration of displaced persons into the local urban field.  The youth house was located in a former kindergarten and offered children from the age of five to eighteen the opportunity to attend various sections.  Language, music, art, dance and video are among the sections offered.  The enrollment was open to all interested.  The project included up to 23% displaced persons and a real amount of integration was accomplished.  As a response to these numbers a natural connection was created with the collective centers being maintained by UMCOR mentioned above.  Originally an effort was made to provide limited transportation to the Youth House, located in the center city, for displaced children.  Once spaces in the collective centers were created for similar activities as offered in the Youth House, this project began a separate “Outreach” project.  While being a perfectly reasonable project development in the emergency phase, that decision cut off the Youth House project off from a sizable displaced population within the urban field.  In the development phase the low percentage of displaced children became the main hurdle to funding the original goals of the Youth House.  Instead of realizing these difficulties it was suggested that the Youth House could be made a sustainable independent organization.  Several other international NGOs had been funded to create local NGO. The International Rescue Committee was awarded the UNHCR Umbrella grant that was designed to fund local NGOs through the experience and infrastructure of the international NGOs.  The UNHCR funding was reduced for the youth house project and UMCOR was forced to create innovation to overcome the cold hard percentage numbers.  The idea developed that the youth house should become a local independent NGO and this is what UMCOR received continued funding to achieve.  The specific plan outlined for sustainability was very vague.  The Youth House was expected to start generating income from their activities and eventually a small tuition might even be created to pay for the activities of the center.  This was the genesis of the proposal candy: income generation as applied in the Bosnian NGO experience.  In the actual implementation of this idea there was confusion about the definition of income generation.  On the fly a new aspect was developed.  It was reasoned that if the activities of children was to finance the cost of a youth center then the children should certainly have some greater incentive than low tuition.  In a hypothetical setting it seemed greater incentive would lead to greater innovation.  In the actual reality it was clear that any income earned by the children went into the common goal of supporting the family unit.  In the early stages of implementation of the program it was clear that the income generated would not be able significantly to support the operating budget of the center.  The funding level of the Youth House had been establish during the emergency phase at between fifty and one hundred thousand dollars.  This level of financing was maintained in 1995 despite the low displaced percentage.  By creating an innovation in the market place of income generation UMCOR was able to divert attention from the central problems of the project itself.  Granted this was not a calculated decision, but developed from the dialogical project design process.   A high percentage of the Youth House budget was required to finance this process.  It did not make much sense to create an account to gather the money for the Youth House and 90% of funds generated were dispersed to the participating children.  The largest customer for the Youth House “Shop” was groups of short-term volunteers who generated 10% of the yearly income.  In 1995 there were six of these groups.  After another year of the income-generating phase of the youth house projects, UMCOR did determine that their goals were not obtainable.  Based on the income generation model UMCOR was able to establish Youth Houses in four other cities within the Republic Of Bosnia.  Currently these centers are funded through UMCOR’s monetization[1] project, which imports American agricultural products for sale in Bosnia.  A part of the proceeds then goes to fund the activities of the youth house projects.  Critics have argued that this project amounts to dumping, these agricultural products are a product of US government subsidies for American farmers and tend to be a destabilizing force within the local bazaar economy.  No other significant source of funding has been identified by UMCOR for the youth house projects.

“Perhaps the sentiments contained in the following pages,

are not YET sufficiently fashionable to procure them

general favour; a long habit of not thinking a thing

WRONG, gives it a superficial appearance of being

RIGHT, and raises at first a formidable outcry in defense

of custom. But the tumult soon subsides. Time makes

more converts than reason.”[i]

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[1] “Monetization involves the importation and sale of US-produced agricultural commodities that are culturally and dietetically appropriate, and using the proceeds from the sale of the commodities to support humanitarian assistance and development programs. After a successful inaugural year in 1997 ($1.9 million was invested)…”from UMCOR’s web site updated 1999.

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[i] COMMON SENSE BY THOMAS PAINE

Waking Up to Kids

If I am wrong I am very good at being wrong, you see I do what I have to to get through and I've made it fine to here.  I know the notions I defend.  I wake up to children around.  They couldn't understand why sleep more.  Children swim in unknown quantities and soon and later we land on certain shores where you find these people beside you and all you know mostly is these people beside you and I know mostly you beside me.  You are one and you are two.  Be one more.  Find on we.

So we are not alone.  Where does life not move.  Go to the ocean with me and tell me of your wars.  Tell me how you win.  Tell me how they lose.  There is the oldest of customs we all share.  Breaking bread for others sharing bread for us.  This is the land of milk and honey find your promise land.  We'll be together again and it will be longer and will be stronger in these simple weaknesses we all share.  The world is changing too good to not realize what you pass you leave what you take you have.

As She Turned to Me

We are artists we create our own exsistence everything creatively creating
We see similar things
We know similar things

Love doesn't walk in love explodes life becomes reality
I have found happiness here I love everything happening right now
How much better it shall be things work out lights become enlivened

Music starts to pour I am enjoying rather most of this
Simple things we know simple things we are simple things we need

Growing Season

As the sun goes round where will it leave you in what is a perfect day when it would come
How good must good be what bad do you see
There is going to be snow you know it will come so

Of all the possible futures they're just not here right now
Down the avenues of your mind on a little walk though your head
Let me ask you this as you answer that a memory seed to grow

In harvest time for me
What is it now I see
When will it be done
And where come from

He could not speak his words and could only speak those words
Just so they would know the story only so he had told his telling
He and they were done with him for they all heard it so well

There's nothing to me I'm what you make me do
These words I don't know they are not mine I have no control
They are not what I want to hear but what I be

The story starts to take form in we
But it shall not last long come out and leave from me

The Same Days

She took him in several different ways simple confusion we all can understand
I wish you well with your spoils as I am well and take my toils
I asked her which sun she liked better, she shrugged, " I haven't seen enough to tell"

I am only a small fool that will never do anyone harm; I have no use for many things
A ruse of a muse on the ground floor where falling down is only a matter of height

Do you hear his song? No longer on paper listen it is the breeze

The amazement of resonance no one is taught that there is so much more than ever thought
Thought I knew where I was going and the wonders never care and paths never end
Smoke and the sun shines can you see it there as I say it here

And the road seems to forever be leading me to the end where I should be
Where I can no longer I myself to find ourselves alone and one
Standing upright the Extravagant Giant lost in this notion of time as confused as sustained

The Extravagant Giant Lumbers Forth

I will write until it is written and then I will be done with them
In any direction but one in a place of now
Anything you'd like to share do you think before you care

This will be finished very quickly and then where will we all go
It was not thought all the way through
Why would it finish now that's not what we did then

This will be finished very quickly we shall be gone soon enough
Well I fell much better now I feel good somehow
That little spider on the wall is welcome to this room an it doesn't seem to mind if I hang out too

Where everything fits content to be small where nothing needs a great size in a universe complete
It is freedom you have and love that you do why choose to blame
Will it stop the rain or take your pain? Your just wet nothing to regret

Attepting to do every perfect nothing one time and the simple way
And I would be finished enough

Euro Rail

There was a simple essence to the ticket to the continent.
Arrive downtown in the main station, walk around, find something stay
Find nothing go there is a train late to somewhere arrives somewhere early

They run on time generally and are warm to my experience
Often slept into Germany somewhere wake eat and return to more interesting places
Never really looked to find things there, Stephi Graf on outdoor televisions at the station
Outside the glass station a cathedral that towers exactly to the heavens above
I wasn't always sure where I was traveling alone

One positive if the Euro ends: the station beggars will once again be able to tell you where you are
As need would have them ask for the right currency if coins are not exchanged again

Opening Day

They say the deer has no natural predator left in Ohio.  I  have seen some in Pennsylvania.  What else would you call a person that could pierce the heart of a deer at 200 yards on a dead run.  A humanitarian and a natural predator.

Maybe it is because of the shot guns they use in Ohio; I don't know never hunted the woods.  The deer have changed I can tell you that.  When I was twelve it was expected to see one buck with several hundred doe and on multiple occasions.  At thirteen they stopped.  Ran across fifty; never saw group bigger than nine since.

That may be just a round number, but a good round number.  Hunted many years and have not hunted in many years.  Never served the ultimate function, but never wavered in the trail.  The last years either they have joined me here in the city or I have begun to notice them.

I drive the city as I once walked the woods.  I know their schedule only watch for them when they would be out and about.  Many things have changed in this world, but not so much the deer's daily schedule.  If you don't know deer maybe best way to explain is that they make many beds.  Most active in the morning and evening.

You know why the farmers stopped the hunter: they were seen as lazy.  A postmodern child could be understood to suppose as has been shown that it was easier.  Not a topic for opening day.  In Pennsylvania its a holiday and the schools close;  like a big government rally in eastern Europe.

Purpose Comes to Light

I'm writing a story of childhood tonight
Not Starting out to remind myself
That purpose found my burden light
Knowing my past my future bright
It's nice to bring memories from the shelf

I started out with no plan set now to be let

Preplated Freedom

Have you ever tasted Freedom
Walked down a blind path
A hidden drive outta sight
Pick berries in any moon light
Glimpsed happiness with no cash
Had no instant credit kingdom

Freedom has no taste for me
A deep breath that's all mine
I thought there was more to see
but now that's just fine

Roses find sun light in our field
Rains upon our ground find pools

There is so little time to comfort her
So many fashions to lose their style

What will become of the whimsical spirit?

BOOK SIX: DOUBLE-CROSS:

                         A tenable coalition existed between Bosnian and Croatian forces to end the ethnic war in 1992.  The destruction of the old bridge in Mostar, the city’s namesake, was a response by armed radical nationalists in the streets to the Vance Owen peace plan.

                         The situation of Mostar and the general state of Muslim-Croatian relations in Bosnia from 1991 through 1993 suggests early attempts at mediation, far from solving problems, may have given the parties more reason to fight.  The Croatian forces in Bosnia used the Vance-Owen map to justify the disarming of Muslims living in areas designated for Croat control. [1] 

                        Stuart Kaufman, using his symbolic politics theory of ethnic war, argues that solving the problems of the region was impossible for the powerful west.  Mediators would need to change Yugoslav leader’s bargaining tactics, policy goals and ruling strategies.[2]   However, assuming this as fact, there seems to be a reasonable expectation that the response of the international community would not make matters worse. 

                        Symbolic politics is an approach that encompasses other varied influences in a hierarchy and explains the development of a security dilemma through hostility and militarism.[3]  Insight into the intensity of the conflict can be then gained observing how a population’s relationship to symbols evolves once ethnic war begins. 

                        The ignorance of the national grievances in the west and their reliance upon ancient hatred as the intractable fact discredited any legitimate nationalistic demands.[4]  Early in this conflict, a focused response from the international community could have brought a quick end.  Unfortunately, the international community was unable to speak with one voice to the groups in conflict.[5]

                        Symbolic politics theory seems to breakdown when applied to the international community.  The large number of nations and unique myth-symbol complexes represented in the international community tends to overwhelm any attempt to apply the theory to their actions.  However, perhaps in future conflicts this theory can be used to finds hints from the last generation that can suggest paths to resolution.

                        Myths, symbols and there manipulation become the deciding force in ethnic war because there is a continuity from generation to generation.  It seems reasonable to search the last forty years to find possible explanations for why it took so many things to go wrong before ethnic war began in Bosnia.[6] 

                        The federation finally created between Muslims and Croats in Bosnia did become the foundation for peace in Bosnia after 1994.[7]  This was possible due the experiences of the last forty years.  The hints from the past may be exceptionally difficult to use as a predictor for ethnic war, but it is possible to search the generational context for lessons to help resolve future ethnic wars using symbolic politics theory.

Myths and Symbols

                        In essence, the last generation had a shared experience and a real basis for alliance as shown by Mostar in the spring of 1992.  The majority of theories advocated either seek to explain the conflict as a case of ancient hatred or through simple rational choice.  Stuart Kaufman has attempted to expose the roots of ethnic conflict through the politics of myths and symbols.  He argues that there are specific conditions required for ethnic war.[8]

                        The idea that people react emotionally to symbols and base political decisions in certain part upon these feelings is the heart of symbolic politics theory.[9]  Michael Sells strengthens this view as he argues religion and religious mythology as important not only for the faithful because the impact is: “far beneath and beyond self-conscious belief, in deeper structures of symbol, society and psychology, and can effect the atheist every bit as much as the self-proclaimed believer.”[10]  Myths and symbols in a more general sense take advantage of the same mechanism.

                        Symbolic politics offers the possibility of a coherent definition of ethnic war.  It is the type of civil-strife that myths and symbols can play a decisive role.  The conflict in Yugoslavia meets all of Kaufman’s conditions:

·  opportunity

·  hostile symbolic myths

·  ethnic fears[11]

Where these are not present, we are dealing with something other than ethnic war.

                        Opportunity was provided by the disinterest of the international community after the cold war.  Hostile myths and ethnic fears in the former Yugoslavia are perhaps the best documented in the literature of ethnic war.  References are made to this war in almost every volume on contemporary world issues.[12] 

                        The intensity of the conflict is partly due to open hostilities and the fact that with an ethnic security dilemma there are people perfectly willing to fight.[13]  However,    symbolic theory does not explain the actions of the international community as clearly.  Kaufman sights the lack of an international institution to facilitate a coherent peace process not as a failure of the international community to produce an appropriate institution, but as a reason that it was probably impossible for the west to prevent the war.[14]

                        The level of open hostility was demonstrated when Biljana Plavsic, an important member of the Bosnian Serb leadership, explained the failure of negotiations with Bosnian Muslims as one of genetics in 1994; she believed that poor genetic material was the reason for their initial conversion to Islam and the obstacle to good faith negotiations.[15]  One could easily mistake her statement for a Nazi speaking of the Serbian population a generation earlier.  As I will focus on the conflict in Mostar, it is necessary to acknowledge the extreme positions that led each side in turn to put myths and discredited reasoning to use in mobilizing ethnic forces.

Mostar

                        Before the war, the cities skyline included an Orthodox Church, Catholic cathedral and Muslim mosque because of centuries of living together in this shared space.[16]  The heart was the bridge over the river Neretva that dates from 1561.  Construction was a multi-religious project drawing artisans and engineers from the surrounding area; the bridge had connected the city for four centuries and survived thirty earthquakes[17]

                        In the spring of 1992, the coalition between Muslim and Croatian forces succeeded in repelling a Serbian advance on the city of Mostar.  However, in July of 1992 the Union of Herceg-Bosna was declared as a Croat state in Bosnia similar to an already establish Republika Srpska.[18]

                        The destruction of the fragile cooperation indicated the victory of the HV and HVO over the HOS variant of Croatian national mobilization.  HOS is the military wing of the fascist Croatian Party of Rights and the HV and HVO were Croatian national armies for Croatia and Bosnia respectively.[19] 

                        Tudjman, president of Croatia and the acknowledged leader of Bosnian Croats, saw Bosnian Muslims as racially and culturally inferior; the historical ustashe movement saw them as simply historical Croatians, corrupted, but no less brother.[20]  The HVO worked to divide Bosnia with the Serbs, while HOS wanted the Serbs out of Bosnia and Greater Croatia realized.[21]

                        Tudjman expressed extremist views quite openly; he suggested that Jews were the main executioners at the Ustashe death camp of Jasenovac due to their nature.[22]  He saw the Muslim culture as little less than Turkish and Islamic contamination in the region that he would Europeanize.[23] 

                        The HVO was formed independent of Sarajevo’s authority and the Bosnian army; Muslims needing all the help they could find were not in any position to object and naturally accepted the reality.[24]  June 16^th, 1992 a formal military alliance was signed that legitimized the use of HV forces in Bosnia.[25]  The HVO took over Herzegovina and HOS essentially lost any independent significance.[26]  HOS, the first Croatian force to mobilize in Bosnia, represented less than twenty percent of their available forces in 1992.[27]

                        By October, Croatian forces took control of the town of Novi Travnik and began to imitate Serbian tactics in Prozor: raping, killing and destroying cultural artifacts.[28]  This same month the Vance-Owen peace plan was first presented to the parties.[29]  In April of 1993, the HVO worked directly with Serbian forces during an assault upon the town of Zepce.[30]  Peace negotiations would have to deal with new realities on the ground.

                        The Invincible plan was the response to the failure of Vance-Owen; a decentralized state was replaced with a federation of three ethnic republics taking into account the reality on the ground.[31]  A great factor in the failure was the belief in the Muslim military establishment that more territory would be gained if the war continued, successes in central Bosnia against Croat forces was a turning point.[32]  The maps would be drawn again.

                        The HVO learned a lesson from the Bosnian Serbs, they saw them rewarded for war crimes and they took a more systematic approach to their offensives.  Symbolic politics theory explains that hostility and militarism, such as the HVO forces wrapped in HOS imagery, created the security dilemma in Mostar[33]. 

                        The ten-month siege of Mostar evolved out of this security dilemma; the HVO forced Muslims across the river in to the eastern part of city.[34]  I first visited Mostar in January of 1996, even at this late date the contradiction was remarkable.  East Mostar was the perfect location for the filming of a WWII movie; two years after the end of hostilities, the majority of the buildings were nothing but rubble.  West Mostar looked the typical Mediterranean city, aside from a few blocks of front line. 

                        The intensity of the conflict has been well documented, but the question remains how the role of symbols evolves once ethnic war begins.  All the facts of the conflict are blurred even seven years after the end of the war, details have not been completely decided.   “Despite an abundance of books about that war, which have been read and interpreted in accordance with various sentimentalist and ideological approaches, both the country and the war that destroyed it remain, for the most part, misunderstood.”[35]  What we are left with are myths, symbols, and impressions. 

                        The population of Mostar went through a demographic shift during the conflict; traumatized refugees came to the city.[36]  Ethnic cleansing created homogeneous populations, but from varied geographical regions so that the populations no longer had a shared relationship to Mostar, but only a relationship to their particular ethnic group.[37]  Perhaps symbols like the bridge become more powerful to people who lack any connection to the city.  A Croatian militiaman working to destroy the bridge was quoted to say, "It is not enough to cleanse Mostar of the Muslims, the relics must also be destroyed."[38]   

                        In November 1993, the bridge was destroyed as the climax of eighteen months of shelling first by the Serbian and then Croatian forces.[39]  The war in Bosnia would continue and to the horror of the world, the worst would continue.  In 1994, the United States working close with Germany was able to revive the Croat/Muslim alliance and a federation in Bosnia was created between the two groups.[40]  The conflict returned to the stage of early 1992, with so much water and bridge under the bridge; an end was finally in sight.

But the most ghastly loss has been the housing at the center of the town near each end of the     Old Bridge, much of it only recently restored. "Maybe," the bombs seem to say in crazed logic of this war, "if we remove the architecture that sustains the people in this community, the people themselves will die." The attacks are not symbolic strikes at the representational value of architecture, as in Italy, but an insane effort to eliminate a people by destroying their architecture.[41]

                        Attempts to avert tragedy in the collapse of Yugoslavia clearly failed for numerous reasons.  However, in 1994 the international community got a second chance to build on the cooperation of the Croatian and Muslim communities.  Using the symbolic politics approach struggles of the previous generation could have offered clues to an early resolution.                            

The Generational Context

                        Under Lenin, Stalin and Tito, who attended comintern leadership lectures in Moscow in the mid-30’s,[42] nationalism was a threat because it could create an all class alliance for nationalistic goals; a bourgeois trick and a good one.[43]  The most significant force was the principle of greater danger: great-power chauvinism was the real threat compared to smaller less conscious national minorities.[44]  In the Soviet experience, Russian nationalism was the greatest problem; in the Yugoslav experience, Serbian nationalism was the focus after the domination of Belgrade during the interwar period. 

                        Croatia was one of the most developed republics.  However, Croatian nationalism was not seen as great-power chauvinism; a greater Croatia was possible only with the support of Germany during WWII.[45]  For the communist, great-power chauvinism of the Serbs created the Ustasha movement. There was a real grievance and a real Croatian dissatisfaction unleashed; domination by Germany filled the roll of force multiplier.[46] 

                        The important implication for a Croatian/Muslim alliance in 1992 is that both of those nationalities grew in consciousness under communism: the idea that their claims were more important in order to balance the nationalities of a multi-ethnic state encouraged each to blossom; communist policies would “address the positive psychological needs of nationalism.”[47]  A strong Yugoslavia based on a weak Serbia is the most important foundation for analysis of the years of ethnic war. 

                        The absence of free political expression tended to excite the highly emotional question of national identity.  By the 1960’s it was becoming clear that nationalism was becoming a greater problem than it had been before WWII.[48]  As Pavlowitch noted in 1988:

      The partition of Yugoslavia, if it could be carried out, would place her successors in a situation of mutual enmity with one another, as well as at the Mercy of their more powerful neighbors.  Her nationality question does, nevertheless, offer a permanent temptation to the mischief-makers of uncompromising solutions, and to all those who fish in troubled waters.[49]

                        Misha Glenny in his exhaustive volume on the Balkans argues that between 1966 and 1972, a period that includes the Croatian Spring, Tito used conflict between Zagreb and Belgrade to consolidate his own power.[50]  A new constitution in 1974 gave greater autonomy to Kosovo and Vojvodina in an attempt to balance the power of Serbia.[51]  Dobrivoj Radosavljevic a Serb communist, who agreed with the majority of Tito’s policies, in 1971 predicted Yugoslavia would pay a large price for the historic error of intensifying Croatian-Serb and Serb-Albanian conflict.[52]

                        Gary Bertsch doing research in Zagreb, based on questionnaires in 1971, found that the heartland of Yugoslavia appeared to be relatively more politically integrated; this included Bosnia and Croatia (except for the Dalmatian coast).[53]  Furthermore, his results showed Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia “attitudinally similar.”[54] 

                        This study hints at the foundations of a coalition between the Muslims and Croats and is an example of the type of information that mediators in future conflicts should search out and document.  Available data clearly indicates that Bosnia and Croatia had shared experienced upon which to build cooperation; policies to create a new Yugoslav citizen, from data available, seem to have worked best on the Croats and Muslims in Bosnia.

Loss of Balance

                        The rise of Milosevic and nationalism in Serbia was possible due to communist policies of the past.  Serbia was the only republic with autonomous regions.  This fact allowed Milosevic to blame decentralization as the culprit for economic problems in Serbia.  The Croatian response was reactive and defensive initially, and helped to fuel ethnic fears that would later destroy Bosnia.[55] 

                        In early 1989, by dominating the autonomous regions along with a close relationship to Montenegro and Macedonia: Milosevic effectively controlled four of eight votes in the collective federal presidency.[56]  Slovenia, which historically was the least integrated into Yugoslavia,[57] had a choice to stay and hope to balance the Serbian threat or to leave the federation.  In the summer of 1989, party leaders stated that they would not accept Serbian domination of the federal presidency.  Milosevic responded by severing all economic ties and denounced their attitude as anti-Yugoslav and anti-Serbian.[58]

                        By 1991, with national grievances bringing Yugoslavia to the brink of all out war, the world was distracted.  The death of Yugoslavia was not a vital interest of the west with the Soviet Union collapsing into fifteen independent states, the Berlin wall gone, Germany one nation and the liberation of Kuwait.[59] 

International Response

                        Mediation by the international community played the role of external threats (the loss or gain of territory) in the model developed by Stevan Pavlowitch:

Alongside organic growth and power apparatus, external threats should also be taken into account as factors of unity, for as long as they do not turn into aggression.  At that point, and when the aggressor sets about brutally exploiting internal differences, the bonds give way, as happened with the German attack of 1941 and with the Ottoman advance at the turn of the fourteenth century.[60]

                       

                        The international community is often defined as the external force that had a profound influence on the mobilization of the nationalities.[61]  Symbolic politics, however, does little to quantify this aspect.  An overview of the world’s response is all that seems possible.       

                        Initial support for the continuation of Yugoslavia first acted to strengthen the position of Milosevic; he had no incentive to accept a decentralized confederation that would decrease the position of Belgrade.^[62]  In contrast, by including Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serbs in negotiations at early stages, the Muslims felt slighted; mediation effectively made them all equal parties and therefore reduced the status of the recognized government.[63]

                        The belief in ancient hatred as the cause of Balkan conflict was the central mistake of the international community.  Canada, for example, held the position that this was a civil war with deep historical roots; the assumption was that these people had always been fighting.[64]  The groups were seen as morally equivalent with no good-guys to be found.[65]

                        A 1993 best-seller, Balkan Ghost by Robert Kaplan, gave the strong impression that with such ancient hatred in the region nothing could be done.  President Clinton new into his office was reportedly among those influenced.[66]  The situation seemed unsolvable in Kaplan’s analysis. 

                        A common misconception is that Bosnia was a creation of Tito and that it has no historical significance or history as a multi-ethnic state.[67]  “The linguistic, historical, and geographic integration of its population was of a higher order than can be found among its neighbors.”[68]  Jack Eller argues that the real conflict was between visions of pluralistic or exclusive societies.[69]

                        Support from the west for the preserving Yugoslavia continued up to the summer of 1991.  However, the subtext was qualified and the wording evolved over time.  There was a perception by the groups in conflict that there would be no real consequences for their actions; they would be accepted eventually and the peace negotiations would include new realities on the ground.[70]

                        Washington supported the idea of self-determination implicitly supporting breakup, but at the same time spoke of both the need to preserve Yugoslavia and to limit the means of Belgrade to do so.[71]  Those most responsible for starting the war created the theory of ancient hatred as a simplistic argument that there was nothing to understand.[72]  In this context contradictory policies and statements from the west resulted; adding more confusion than support for resolution.

                        Using Pavlowitch’s ideas from 1988, one can argue that the international community represented the historical outsider that has so often been the signal of great suffering in the Balkans.[73]  However, any belief that the international community could have solved or not intensified the problems assumes that a coherent response was possible through the actions of countless individuals in west.

                        Kaufman’s symbolic politics defines the reason for ethnic war as myths supporting hostility and the how as manipulation of symbols.[74]  This theory seems best suited to explain actions on the ground, but a larger context is missing: ethnic war does not exist in a vacuum.

Conclusion

                        Symbolic politics best describes situation up to the security dilemma and offers good insight into the intensity of the conflict.  Continuity can be seen in the myths and symbols through the generations.  The recent past should then offer the best source of information for resolution of conflict.  Appling the theory to the international community’s response seems more problematic.

                        The coalition between Bosnian and Croatian developed out of a shared experience; there seems to be indications in the older generation that they were better integrated into the communist system.  The situation was much more difficult in 1994, but the Federation between the Croats and Muslims demonstrates the potential of a similar plan in 1992; the basis for ethnic fear and hostile myths had only been increased in the years of conflict.

                         The situation of Mostar from 1991 through 1993 demonstrates the intensity ethnic war can reach.  The HVO’s use of the Vance-Owen map for their deadly designs indicates that there was a significant role played by the international community.[75]

                        Stuart Kaufman theory of ethnic war offers tools to evaluate developments in Mostar, but offers little help in separating and evaluating the impact of the various interventions and attempts at mediation.  However, the impression that the problems were unsolvable was encouraged by the leaders of each group.[76]  

                        Symbolic politics, an approach that encompasses many varied influences, fails to help explain the international context of ethnic war.  Kaufman hints at the greater applicability of his theory and shows security dilemmas do not develop from anarchy, but have quantifiable causes.[77]  Unfortunately, as great as the insight gained into the causes and intensity of the conflict a theory more able to include factors outside of the Balkans remains elusive. 

                        Misconception of Bosnia tended to question the possibility of coexistence;[78] the end of the war through the creation of a Muslim/Croat federation demonstrates the reality.  Better possibilities were certainly possible, a greater focus on a general cease-fire instead of local ones could have saved more lives.  However, there was always a risk of appearing as accepting defacto partition and ethnic cleansing. [79]

                        Symbolic politics theory stumbles when applied to the international community.  However, there is a real basis to believe that the approach can be used to identify strategies for future conflict mediation.             Myths, symbols and their manipulation have continuity from generation to generation; it is vital to search the last forty years to find hints for resolution.  

                        Federation between Muslims and Croats in Bosnia was the foundation for peace in Bosnia.  Using symbolic politics theory, the hints from the past offer a generational context to help explain this resolution.  Furthermore, the approach offers the best chance to understand the intensity once war begins.

                        My first experience in Bosnia was March of 1995; July 11, Srebrenica became the latest tragedy in the continuing war.  The sense I received was one of indignation, the fight should have never been started, should not have continued and made no sense.

                        Symbolic politics theory offers the chance to extract a clear development and chronology.  If ethnic war ever existed in a vacuum, the approach could thoroughly explain the seemingly chaotic developments.  However, the context of the wider world seems to reveal limitation in the applications of the theory.  Future would be mediators could create a more coherent approach using the strengths of symbolic politics theory.

---

[1] Sells, Michael Anthony. The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 100.

[2] Stuart J. Kaufman, Modern Hatred: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001), 166.

[3] Ibid, 221.

[4] Jack David Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict (Ann Arbor:: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 244

[5] Saadia Touval, Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 15.

[6] Kaufman, Modern Hatred, 200.

[7] Touval, Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars, 127

[8] Kaufman, Modern Hatred, 203-204

[9] Ibid, 29.

[10] Michael Sells, “The Construction of Islam in Serbian Religious Mythology and Its Consequences” in Islam and Bosnia: Conflict Resolution And Foreign Policy in Multi-Ethnic States ed Maya Shatzmiller, (Montreal, Kingston, London, and Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 57

[11] Ibid, 34.

[12] Rusmir Mahmutcehajic, Sarajevo Essays: Politics, Ideology, and Tradition, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003) 5.

[13] Kaufman, Modern Hatred, 34.

[14] Ibid, 166

[15] Michael Sells, “The Construction of Islam in Serbian Religious Mythology and Its Consequences,” 58.

[16] Sells. The Bridge Betrayed, 93.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Sells, The Bridge Betrayed, 96.

[19] Glenny,  The Balkans, 645.

[20] Ibid

[21] Sells, The Bridge Betrayed, 99

[22] Ibid, 95.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid, 96.

[25] Malcom 240

[26] Sells, The Bridge Betrayed, 99.

[27] Malcom 240.

[28] Sells, The Bridge Betrayed, 96.

[29] Touval, Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars, 120.

[30] Sells, The Bridge Betrayed, 102.

[31] Touval, Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars, 123.

[32] Ibid, 125.

[33] Kaufman, Modern Hatred, 221.

[34] Sells, The Bridge Betrayed, 92.

[35] Rusmir Mahmutcehajic, Sarajevo Essays: Politics, Ideology, and Tradition, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003) 5.

[36] Andrew Herscher “Remembering and Rebuilding in Bosnia An architect argues that the right blend of reconstruction can help revive multiculturalism” Transitions vol. 5 no. 3 (March, 1998)

[37] Ibid

[38] Sells, The Bridge Betrayed, 93.

[39] Ibid, 113-114

[40] Touval, Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars, 127.

[41] Nicholas Adam, “Architecture as the Target.” Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, (vol. 52, December 1993.) 389-390.

[42] Misha Glenny,  The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804-1999, (New York: Viking Penguin, 2000), 572.

[43] Terry Martin, “An Affirmative-Action Empire: The Emergence of the Soviet Nationalities Policy 1919-1923,” in The Structure of Soviet History, ed Ronald Grigor Suny (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 94.

[44] Ibid, 97.

[45] Pavlowitch, The Improbable Survivor, 10.

[46] Ibid,

[47] Martin, “An Affirmative-Action Empire,” 99

[48] Pavlowitch, The Improbable Survivor, 75.

[49] Ibid, 77.

[50] Glenny,  The Balkans, 572.

[51] Vojin Dimitrijevic, “The 1974 Constitution and Constitutional Process as a Factor in the collapse of Yugoslavia,” in Yugoslavia: The Former and Future, ed. Payam Akhavan, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995) 59.

[52] Glenny,  The Balkans, 593.

[53] Gary Bertsch, Nation Building in Yugoslavaia: A Study of Political Integration and Attitudinal Consensus (London: Sage Publications, 1971) 20.

[54] Ibid, 29

[55] Mahmutcehajic, Sarajevo Essays, 121.

[56] Kaufman, Modern Hatred, 181.

[57] Bertsch, Nation Building in Yugoslavaia 20.

[58] Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict, 290.

[59] Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998), 24.

[60] Stevan K. Pavlowitch, The Improbable Survivor: Yugoslavia and its problems, 1918-1988 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1988), 55.

[61] Mahmutcehajic, Sarajevo Essays, 118.

[62] Marc Weller, “The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” American Journal of International Law (86, no. 3 July 1992), 569-607.

[63] Touval, Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars 116.

[64] Nader Hashemi, “Peacekeeping with No Peace to Keep: The Failure of Canadian Foreign Policy in Bosnia” in Islam and Bosnia: Conflict Resolution And Foreign Policy in Multi-Ethnic States ed Maya Shatzmiller, (Montreal, Kingston, London, and Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 187.

[65] Ibid, 189.

[66] Holbrooke,  To End a War, 22..

[67] Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict, 244.

[68] Mahmutcehajic, Sarajevo Essays, 117.

[69] Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict, 245.

[70] Touval, Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars, 15.

[71] Ibid, 22

[72] Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict, 245.

[73] Pavlowitch, The Improbable Survivor: Yugoslavia and its problems, 1918-1988, 55-56.

[74] Kaufman, Modern Hatred, 210

[75] Sells, The Bridge Betrayed, 100.

[76] Kaufman, Modern Hatred, 166.

[77] Ibid, 221.

[78] Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict, 244

[79] Touval, Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars 132.